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Social learning and culture in animals
Abstract
Most animals must learn some of the behaviours in their repertoire, and some must learn most. Although
learning is often thought of as an individ-ual exercise, in nature much learning is social, i.e. under the
influence of conspecifics. Social learners acquire novel information or skills faster and at lower cost, but
risk learning false information or useless skills. Social learning can be divided into learning from social
information and learning through social interaction. Different species have different mechanisms of
learning from social information, ranging from selective attention to the environment due to the
presence of others to copying of complete motor sequences. In vertical (or oblique) social learning,
naïve individuals often learn skills or knowledge from parents (or other adults), whereas horizon-tal
social learning is from peers, either immatures or adults, and more often concerns eavesdropping and
public information use. Because vertical social learning is often adaptive, maturing individuals often
have a prefer-ence for it over individual exploration. The more cognitively demanding social learning
abilities probably evolved in this context, in lineages where offspring show long association with
parents and niches are complex. Be-cause horizontal learning can be maladaptive, especially when
perishable information has become outdated, animals must decide when to deploy social learning. Social
learning of novel skills can lead to distinct traditions or cultures when the innovations are sufficiently
rare and effectively transmitted socially. Animal cultures may be common but to date taxo-nomic
coverage is insufficient to know how common. Cultural evolution is potentially powerful, but largely
confined to humans, for reasons currently unknown. A general theory of culture is therefore badly
needed.
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ABSTRACT 
Most animals must learn some of the behaviours in their repertoire, and 
some must learn most. Although learning is often thought of as an individ-
ual exercise, in nature much learning is social, i.e. under the influence of 
conspecifics. Social learners acquire novel information or skills faster and 
at lower cost, but risk learning false information or useless skills. Social 
learning can be divided into learning from social information and learning 
through social interaction. Different species have different mechanisms of 
learning from social information, ranging from selective attention to the 
environment due to the presence of others to copying of complete motor 
sequences. In vertical (or oblique) social learning, naïve individuals often 
learn skills or knowledge from parents (or other adults), whereas horizon-
tal social learning is from peers, either immatures or adults, and more often 
concerns eavesdropping and public information use. Because vertical so-
cial learning is often adaptive, maturing individuals often have a prefer-
ence for it over individual exploration. The more cognitively demanding 
social learning abilities probably evolved in this context, in lineages where 
offspring show long association with parents and niches are complex. Be-
cause horizontal learning can be maladaptive, especially when perishable 
information has become outdated, animals must decide when to deploy so-
cial learning. Social learning of novel skills can lead to distinct traditions 
or cultures when the innovations are sufficiently rare and effectively 
transmitted socially. Animal cultures may be common but to date taxo-
nomic coverage is insufficient to know how common. Cultural evolution is 
potentially powerful, but largely confined to humans, for reasons currently 
unknown. A general theory of culture is therefore badly needed. 
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20.1 Introduction 
The traditional null model of behavioural ontogeny is that animals acquire 
their species-specific behavioural repertoires through maturation of geneti-
cally anchored developmental programs (instincts), supplemented by indi-
vidual exploration of environmental affordances (individual learning). The 
main reason for this position, however, may turn out to be an historical ac-
cident: Comparative psychology developed as an experimental, laboratory-
based, rather than a field-based naturalistic science. In the wild, opportuni-
ties for social learning arise whenever animals interact or even are in mere 
proximity.  
Learning is a change in the brain produced by experience. We usually 
call this change knowledge or skill, and infer that it occurred by noting a 
change in behaviour. Social learning is learning under the influence of 
conspecifics. More formally, social learning, or socially mediated learning, 
can be defined as changes in an individual’s behaviour resulting from at-
tending to another individual’s behaviour or its products (Box 1984, Fra-
gaszy and Perry 2003). Social learning is different from communication. 
Both involve responding to conspecifics (see Schaefer, this volume), but 
communication usually does not involve learning. However, there is some 
overlap, as in learning through social interaction (see below). 
Through social learning, animals can acquire information or skills they 
would otherwise not have obtained, or acquire routine skills faster. It is 
therefore not surprising that social learning is the default mode of learning 
by naïve individuals in those animal species where overlapping genera-
tions and long parent-offspring association enable this. But, as we will see, 
that does not necessarily mean that traditions and cultures are widespread, 
nor that animals will always rely on cues from conspecifics, even if they 
are available. 
I first examine social learning by asking a number of proximate ques-
tions about how (mechanisms), what (content), when (at what age and 
from whom) and where (contexts). I then turn to ultimate questions, such 
as its adaptive significance and the factors favouring the evolution of the 
more advanced sorts of social learning. But we can also ask an additional 
set of questions, concerning the consequences of social learning at the 
level of populations and species. An immediate consequence can be cul-
ture, whereas in the long run social-learning skills can co-evolve with ten-
dencies to explore and innovate, and thus intelligence. 
Throughout, the reader must keep in mind that social learning is studied 
in very different research traditions that have developed largely independ-
ently from each other. Behavioural ecologists have generally focused on 
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adults gathering ecologically relevant information (horizontal transmis-
sion), whereas psychologists (and primatologists and anthropologists) have 
generally focussed on the mechanisms of immatures acquiring skills (ver-
tical transmission). These traditions complement each other, and I will 
therefore try to integrate their approaches. 
20.2 Proximate aspects of social learning 
20.2.1 How: mechanisms of social learning 
Social learning is quite heterogeneous in terms of mechanisms. Learning 
by attending to social information has received most attention. It may be 
used for the acquisition of social skills through eavesdropping (i.e. observ-
ing social interactions between others: e.g. Valone 2007), but it is most 
studied in the context of acquiring subsistence skills. It encompasses a va-
riety of poorly understood processes, and the technical literature is compli-
cated and confusing. The interested reader is referred to Byrne (2002), 
Whiten et al. (2004), Subiaul (2007) and Hoppitt and Laland (2008).  
For the present purpose, I divide learning by attending to social informa-
tion into a few major categories (Table 20.1). In the simplest category are 
social or response facilitation (non-specific increases in activity as a result 
of the proximity or activity of conspecifics) and selective association (fol-
lowing role models around), the latter perhaps simply as a consequence of 
gregariousness. These forms of social learning share the property that the 
presence of others biases the exploratory tendency of the naïve individuals. 
Yet, this mechanism may be sufficient for young animals to acquire the 
same diet as their mothers, simply by following her around and thus selec-
tively encountering, and learning about, whatever she eats (van der Post 
and Hogeweg 2006). 
The next major category includes cases where naïve animals use the 
presence or behaviour of other animals as pointers to a specific site or ob-
ject upon which to focus their own independent exploration and learning 
(enhancement). This may help naïve animals to develop preferences or 
skills by exposing them to the affordances of objects and foods. Enhance-
ment is closely related to social information use (Valone 2007), where 
animals base decisions to forage or move or their choice of mates on ob-
servation of the presence and activity of conspecifics. Such information 
use becomes enhancement when the animals doing this learn something 
new in the process. 
Indirect forms of enhancement may also be found. Thus, naïve animals 
may increase exploration upon encountering the feeding sign of con-
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specifics. For instance, aye-ayes (Daubentonia madagascariensis) engage 
in tap foraging, in which they tap on branches with a specialized long-
nailed finger and listen for cavities. Upon discovery of a cavity, they gnaw 
a hole and fish out larvae. Young aye-ayes are attracted to the holes made 
by other aye-ayes, and explore them selectively (Krakauer 2005).  
In all these cases, the presence or actions of conspecifics lead naïve 
animals to learn about the environment, but the latter do not necessarily 
pay attention to the models’ actions. In the following two major categories, 
they do (Subiaul 2007). In simple observational learning, species-typical 
actions are copied. For instance, in mate copying, seen in fishes and birds, 
females copy the mate choice of other females observed to mate with par-
ticular (types of) males (Witte 2006). Another form is so-called observa-
tional conditioning, in which learners copy the striking responses of mod-
els that accompany alarm calls, and learn to associate them with the 
releasing stimuli (e.g. predator sightings). Many primates learn the proper 
use of alarm calls this way (Seyfarth and Cheney 1980). Note that in ob-
servational conditioning, the naïve animals are socially fine-tuning what 
are basically instinctive actions, using the reactions of experienced con-
specifics to classify or label other animals or objects. The copying of 
known motor patterns as seen in many birds and some primates (Zentall 
2004, Subiaul 2007) is often referred to as contextual or familiar imitation. 
This is not a trivial ability because it somehow requires a translation from 
perception into action, and probably relies on dedicated neural mecha-
nisms, such as the presence of mirror neurons, i.e. neurons that fire both 
when an action is performed and when the same action is observed in oth-
ers (Rizzolatti 2005). 
The final major category of social learning is observation learning 
through production imitation (also: motor or novel imitation), which refers 
to the copying of novel actions or action sequences (emulation, the copy-
ing of the goals of the model’s actions, is probably very similar). This abil-
ity is remarkably common among birds (Zentall 2004), but among pri-
mates motor imitation has so far only been found in apes while monkeys 
are capable of contextual imitation at best (Whiten and van Schaik 2007). 
Subiaul (2007) speculates that this is because production imitation requires 
neural adaptations that mediate the planning and coordination of gross and 
fine motor patterns. 
As to the cognitive abilities required, there is broad consensus that ob-
servational learning is cognitively more demanding than non-observational 
social learning, and that production imitation is more demanding than con-
text imitation. For instance, human infants develop the ability to copy 
known motor actions before they can copy novel actions or action se-
quences (Masur 1988). Moreover, among primates, there are taxonomic 
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neurobiological differences that support the presence of production imita-
tion in humans but not in monkeys (reviewed in Subiaul 2007). Finally, at 
least among mammals, the taxonomic distribution of this ability may turn 
out to be correlated with the presence of mirror-self-recognition, cognitive 
empathy, and elements of a theory of mind (de Waal 2001, Heyes 2001). 
However, because documenting the actual abilities involved in social 
learning requires careful experiments, we know very little about the taxo-
nomic distribution and the link with other cognitive abilities or even brain 
size.  
In addition to learning from social information, Table 20.1 recognises a 
second major kind of social learning: learning through social interaction. 
This form of social learning overlaps extensively with communication, but 
differs in that it also involves conditioning (learning) as a result of the in-
dividual’s social interactions: agonistic and affiliative behaviour, as well as 
social play (e.g. Pellegrini et al. 2007). Learning through social interac-
tions (or socialisation: Box 1984) is probably the major means by which 
immature animals acquire social skills, as suggested by social deprivation, 
which produces socially incompetent adults (Harlow and Harlow 1962) 
and by interspecific cross-fostering, which shows adjustment to reigning 
social norms (de Waal and Johanowicz 1993).  
Learning through social interaction normally plays no role in the learn-
ing of subsistence skills or ecological knowledge, but teaching, which 
does, also belongs in this category. In teaching, the model takes an active 
role. A behaviour pattern qualifies as teaching if certain actions only occur 
in the presence of a naïve observer, carry some cost but are not immedi-
ately beneficial to the teacher, and if the observer profits from these ac-
tions in that it learns these actions faster than it would otherwise do (Caro 
and Hauser 1992). This does not require that the teacher is aware of the 
knowledge state of the naïve animal, i.e. that the teaching is intentional, al-
though that would make it more effective. It should therefore be expected 
in many species, but although it has over the past few years been found in 
various species, far more striking is its absence in most. The species in 
which it is present are largely characterised by one or both of the following 
two conditions: (i) the presence of complex diets, where naïve individuals 
need help to familiarise themselves with the affordances of their food, usu-
ally fast-moving prey or embedded food items that must be extracted; and 
(ii) the presence of altruistic tendencies on the part of the teacher, be it 
through high relatedness or prosocial attitudes or both, as in cooperative 
breeders (Hoppitt et al. 2008, Burkart and van Schaik 2009; Burkart et al. 
in press). 
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20.2.2 What: the content of social learning 
Dawkins (1976) coined the term ‘meme’ for the fundamental unit of so-
cially transmitted information, and although it has led to some theorising, 
it has not caught on among those studying social learning (Aunger 2007). 
One reason is the association with selfish genes, which has led to a theo-
retical focus on parasitic behavioural innovations to the exclusion of the 
numerous useful ones (see below). Another reason is the strongly anthro-
pomorphic focus, which meant that meme transmission was equated with 
production imitation, thus ignoring the variability of socially transmitted 
behaviours found among animals. I will therefore refer to ‘informational 
variant’ for the general case and use more detailed words where possible. 
Here, I propose the following classification of informational variants 
that can be acquired, with or without modification, through social learning: 
perishable information, non-perishable information (or labels), skills and 
knowledge, signal variants, and symbols (after van Schaik et al. 2003). 
Perishable information refers to the kind of information that is often easily 
gleaned by associating with another individual, or even observing this in-
dividual from afar, summarised as ‘knowing where’. Non-perishable in-
formation or labels, on the other hand, is about ‘knowing that’ (also: de-
clarative knowledge). Thus, knowing that a particular kind of red berry is 
edible is a label, whereas knowing that this week there is a good patch of 
them at a particular location is perishable information. Similarly, knowing 
that a particular animal is a predator is a label, but knowing where it 
roamed yesterday and where it might be today, is perishable information. 
A skill refers to ‘knowing how,’ e.g. about how to access food, or how to 
swing to another tree (also: procedural knowledge). Some informational 
variants may be harder to classify. Thus, remembering that these red ber-
ries tend to be available at a particular location at this time of year is either 
knowledge or skill, though certainly not perishable information. 
The final two categories refer to social communication. A signal variant 
is an alternative way to signal the same particular message. For instance, 
vocal dialects contain signal variants, because one assumes that the content 
of the message conveyed is not affected by the change in acoustical fea-
tures. Other cases concern the non-vocal domain. Thus, orang-utans 
(Pongo abelii and P. pygmaeus) produce kiss-squeaks when in distress, 
and have created geographic variants. In some regions, orang-utans place 
these kisses on (bundles of) leaves. The meaning is the same, albeit per-
haps more pronounced (Hardus et al. 2009). A symbol is a communicative 
variant that is arbitrary, its meaning having become a local or regional 
convention, rather than species-wide, as in signals. Thus, orang-utan moth-
ers, in some localities but not others, make acoustically distinct sounds to 
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call in their infants, but the actual sounds vary among populations (A. 
Lameira et al. unpubl. data). 
Different social-learning mechanisms may be minimally needed to ac-
quire these different classes of variants, with skills almost certainly requir-
ing observational learning. It is not clear how the communicative variants 
are learned socially, although vocal learning in birds is known to involve 
dedicated neural circuits (Prather et al. 2008). All information variants be-
yond perishable information are thought to arise through innovation, either 
of the inadvertent, accidental kind or by cognitively more demanding 
processes such as insight. Little is known, however, of the processes that 
produce innovation. 
20.2.3 From whom: deployment strategies and transmission 
biases 
If an animal is learning socially, whom should it pick as a model (Laland 
2004)? A crucial distinction here is between (i) vertical or oblique social 
learning, by immatures from parents (vertical) or other adults (oblique), 
and (ii) horizontal social learning, which is among peers, and usually stud-
ied among adults. 
Consider vertical social learning first. A simple prediction is that young 
animals have more to learn from others than adults, and that the motivation 
for social learning should therefore decline with age. This is well known, 
but rarely documented in a way one can compare across species, although 
interesting taxonomic variation is expected. For instance, in species with 
extensive cultural repertoires, such as great apes, adults may continue to be 
interested in, and capable of, social learning (e.g. Whiten et al. 2005), al-
though this is not always the case (see 20.3.3). 
A second straightforward prediction is that naïve animals should always 
be selectively attending in situations where novel skills or information can 
be acquired. In many species, young behave like apprentices: following 
their mother or other caretakers around with intense curiosity, and paying 
special attention when difficult skills are being demonstrated (Fig. 20.1). 
Foraging skills are often learned because infants scrounge partly processed 
foods from the mother (Terkel 1996, Jaeggi et al. 2008, Rapaport and 
Brown 2008), or selectively focus on her activities when she targets foods 
that are rare or difficult to process (Tarnaud and Yamagiwa 2008, Jaeggi et 
al. 2010). As a result, long-term studies of the development of maturing 
individuals show that they tend to acquire the variants used by those with 
whom they associated the most (Perry and Ordoñez 2006; but see Mat-
thews 2009; see also BOX 20.1).  
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Other decisions are also relevant. If there is a choice among models, 
which of those should a naïve animal attend to? One generally expects 
there to be some transmission bias. The most obvious solution is to focus 
attention on those individuals that show the best mastery and allow being 
observed, which is what naïve chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys do in 
the case of nut cracking (Matsuzawa et al. 2001, Biro et al. 2003; Ottoni et 
al. 2005) – a tendency known as model-based or prestige bias (Richerson 
and Boyd 2005). This tendency is also captured in de Waal’s (2001) BIOL 
rule: bonding- and identification-based observational learning. However, 
this rule additionally postulates a ‘desire to be like others’ on the part of 
the naïve immature, i.e. social conformity. This addition may be most per-
tinent for signal variants and symbols, because they do not differ in con-
tent. 
It is also possible that the naïve individual is exposed to multiple distinct 
variants. The null hypothesis then is that an animal simply adopts whatever 
behaviour is demonstrated most commonly, or is demonstrated by the larg-
est number of models. If the learner can evaluate the value of each variant, 
she may simply adopt the one or ones she finds satisfactory (known as 
content bias; cf. Galef 1995). This is evident for labels, involving food 
choice or predator recognition, but may also be relevant where learners 
carefully evaluate a new feeding skill. However, suboptimal choices may 
also ensue. First, animals may be conservative, i.e. have a tendency to stick 
to the technique they know well, even if other, more efficient techniques 
are shown to them by others in the group (Biro et al. 2003; Hrubesch et al. 
2009). Second, they may display a disproportionate tendency to follow the 
majority in their choice (positive frequency dependence), i.e. conformity 
(Efferson et al. 2008). A common cause of conformity is obligate gregari-
ousness, which forces all animals to make the same choices when explor-
ing alternatives require leaving the group (Day et al. 2001). Active con-
formity is common among humans, partly because it is the optimal 
decision when information about the variants is poor (informational con-
formity), and partly because it is a sign of group membership or may be a 
socially imposed norm (normative conformity: Henrich and McElreath 
2007). 
Social learning can also be horizontal. In this context, it is possible that 
new skills or important knowledge are gained (Page and Ryan 2006), but 
much horizontal transfer also concerns perishable information about the 
current state of the environment or of conspecifics. Behavioural ecologists 
often distinguish between public information use and eavesdropping. In 
the use of public information (also: inadvertent social information), indi-
viduals learn about the current state of the local environment by attending 
to the behavioural decisions or the success rates of others. The information 
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is gained from inadvertent cues, not signals (see Schaefer, this volume). 
Examples include foraging animals using the behaviour of others to deter-
mine whether a particular food patch is worth visiting or where to settle for 
breeding (Valone 2007). 
Eavesdropping is a form of social learning about the quality of other in-
dividuals by attending to their social interactions, e.g. fights, usually focus-
ing on the signals being exchanged. It is social learning because the eaves-
dropper often subsequently modifies its behaviour, but what is learned is 
usually perishable information, e.g. the fighting ability of a particular indi-
vidual or the attractivity of that individual as a mate. Eavesdropping has 
been demonstrated through elegant experiments (Dabelsteen 2005). It is 
surprisingly common among birds, and may also be widespread among 
mammals (Valone 2007). One well-studied example is ‘mate choice copy-
ing,’ where females show a preference for mating with a male that they 
had just seen successfully mate with another female over other, otherwise 
similar males (Witte 2006). This makes sense when other information to 
choose between potential mates is absent; indeed, copying is more com-
mon when the males are evenly matched or when females are naïve (Va-
lone 2007). 
There is an interesting contrast in the emphases of different research 
traditions (Bonnie and Earley 2007). Psychologists (and with them prima-
tologists) are generally interested in vertical and oblique social learning, 
often with a strong focus on mechanisms, and thus also in cultural phe-
nomena in the wild. Many anthropologists have similar interests, although 
they take the presence of complex social-learning mechanisms for granted, 
and instead concentrate on context and content biases in the deployment of 
these social-learning abilities. Behavioural ecologists, in contrast, are 
rarely interested in mechanisms, and often focus on horizontal social learn-
ing of perishable information in field conditions. As a result, they tend to 
focus on eavesdropping and public information use, rather than culture 
(Table 20.2).  
These different traditions have led to some important gaps in our 
knowledge. Most importantly, psychologists and primatologists rarely 
study horizontal transmission, especially not in the wild, whereas behav-
ioural ecologists tend not to know which mechanisms their subjects are us-
ing, even when they must often go beyond enhancement (cf. Galef and Gi-
raldeau 2001). 
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20.3 Social learning as an adaptation 
20.3.1 When is social learning adaptive? 
The previous section leaves little doubt that social learning is generally 
adaptive and that the various social learning mechanisms evolved through 
natural selection. However, that does not mean that social learning is al-
ways the optimum way of acquiring information. Here, I explore in more 
detail under what conditions the ability to learn socially is adaptive. In 
general, social learning confers adaptive significance if  
BSL – CSL > BIL – CIL,  
where B refers to a fitness benefit, C to a fitness cost and the subscripts SL 
and IL stand for social and individual learning, respectively.  
The main reason why social learning is generally adaptive is obvious: 
CSL << CIL. Social learning frees up individuals from having to decide 
which environmental stimuli to attend to, thus fundamentally improving 
the signal-to-noise ratio of environmental inputs for an individual. More-
over, individual learning involves costs (Mery and Kawecki 2004), as well 
as risks, especially if it involves exploration (Mettke-Hofmann et al. 2006). 
Social learning thus reduces such costs and risks, while speeding up the 
acquisition of skills or knowledge, making it an adaptive strategy under a 
wide range of conditions. 
This analysis assumes that the models are indifferent. However, from 
the demonstrator’s perspective, there may also be costs or benefits to being 
copied. Consider horizontal transmission first. Assume that the possession 
of the information or the skill provides a clear fitness benefit. Then, if 
there is negative density dependence in the population, models would lose 
fitness if they are being copied (i.e. provide public information). Thus, one 
might expect animals to actively reduce the risk of being copied by making 
activities inconspicuous to others or even driving others away, unless they 
benefit from attracting others into their proximity or are surrounded by 
relatives, or there is group augmentation (Kokko et al. 2001). Similarly, 
some animals may incur a cost from having their signals intercepted by 
eavesdroppers. For instance, courtship activities in birds often attract male 
neighbours, who then interfere with mating (Dabelsteen 2005, Valone 
2007). As a result, we expect some signals, e.g. courtship vocalisations, to 
be highly directed, which they indeed are in red-winged blackbirds (Age-
laius pheoniceus: Patricelli et al. 2007). Vertical transmission of skills or 
knowledge, on the other hand, generally involves a stake in the learner’s 
welfare through kinship or group augmentation, making it in the demon-
strator’s interest to ensure that the information or skill is passed on. Unfor-
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tunately, very few studies have specifically tested these straightforward 
predictions. 
20.3.2 Vertical social learning 
Returning to the learner’s perspective, we can ask when skills or informa-
tion acquired through social learning are adaptive separately for vertical 
and horizontal social learning. Vertical social learning is most likely to be 
adaptive because immatures are naïve and must acquire many of their 
skills though learning. Indeed, maturing individuals in many species may 
prefer to learn socially. First, such a preference is also suggested by exam-
ples of the avoidance of novel foods by immatures until a parent has eaten 
it (meerkats: Thornton 2008; aye-ayes: Krakauer 2005; callitrichids: Rapa-
port and Brown 2008; chimpanzees: Ueno and Matsuzawa 2005), as well 
as by the very low rates of independent food exploration among immature 
wild orangutans (Jaeggi et al. 2010). Second, it is strongly suggested by 
cross-fostering experiments. Such experiments are most feasible in birds, 
where eggs can be exchanged between nests of different species. Growing 
up with another species had a dramatic impact on the overall behaviour of 
the transplanted individuals in cockatoos or titmice (Rowley and Chapman 
1986, Slagsvold and Wiebe 2006). These findings support the assumption 
that especially the young and naïve actually show a preference for social 
learning over individual exploration. Overall, these findings suggest that 
our null model of individual learning, with social learning added occasion-
ally, is probably utterly wrong for all species in which vertical learning of 
skills is important. It is certainly wrong for humans (Meltzoff et al. 2009). 
Nonetheless, even vertical social learning may sometimes be maladap-
tive to the learner (i.e. BSL << BIL) in some conditions. In humans, young 
children rely extensively on social learning, cobbling pretty much their 
whole repertoire together through copying. The adoption of dangerous pas-
times, such as rock climbing, or costly customs, such as low fertility, 
shows that the unquestioning copying of behaviour patterns shown by 
prestigious role models or the whole community need not be adaptive 
(Richerson and Boyd 2005). Why are human youngsters so uncritical? The 
most plausible explanation is that our socially learned skills are so numer-
ous and so complicated that the best strategy for a youngster is to simply 
copy without much individual evaluation. On average, this tendency is 
clearly adaptive, although maladaptive habits may also arise (Richerson 
and Boyd 2005). This argument is supported by comparisons between 
chimpanzees and children: human children tend to imitate irrelevant details 
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of a demonstrated task whereas chimpanzees do not (Horner and Whiten 
2005), a phenomenon known as over-imitation (Lyons et al. 2007). 
20.3.3 Horizontal social learning 
Let us now turn to horizontal learning. Here, the asymmetry in knowledge 
and skills is less obvious than between caretaker and young, and it is more 
likely that socially acquired information may be misleading, especially 
when it is perishable. This point is intuitively obvious: because the loca-
tion of food or the identity of the optimal mate vary over time, simply 
copying the choices of others will not necessarily produce optimum deci-
sions. Indeed, because public information is often less reliable than indi-
vidual information, individuals use it as an additional rather than the sole 
source of information on the environment (Galef 1995, Giraldeau et al. 
2002), and tend to ignore public information when they have reliable pri-
vate information (van Bergen et al. 2004, Valone 2007). 
Another reason may be the cost of learning when the animal already 
possesses a certain skill, e.g. how to remove food in an extractive-foraging 
task. If another individual shows another technique for the same task, 
adopting the new technique would be adaptive if the potential increase in 
future yield rate exceeds the learning costs (which also includes a tempo-
rary depression in yield). Animals obviously cannot easily estimate the 
utility of switching to another technique. Research on captive chimpanzees 
shows that individuals that have mastered one technique to solve a task are 
reluctant to invest in learning another technique to solve the same task 
(Marshall-Pescini and Whiten 2008, Hrubesch et al. 2009). Now that this 
conservatism has been revealed, it is interesting to find out which condi-
tions may compel individuals to invest in learning new skills. 
Rogers (1988) argued that the value of socially learned information in-
evitably declines, and eventually the benefit of social learning relative to 
individual learning disappears (see also Boyd and Richerson 1985). This 
conclusion is too strong. As we saw, it is often adaptive to acquire knowl-
edge (e.g. is this fruit edible?) or skills (how do I extract these seeds?), 
which are useful, perhaps after some modification or generalisation. Per-
haps the safest generalisation at present is that preferential reliance on ver-
tical social learning of skills is often adaptive, whereas preferential reli-
ance on horizontal social learning to acquire perishable information is 
often maladaptive. 
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20.3.4 Evolution of social-learning abilities 
The simplest forms of social learning require no more than selective asso-
ciation or facilitation, and selection could easily favour such a tendency if 
the information acquired in this way is on average adaptive. However, un-
der what conditions could selection have favoured the evolution of the 
cognitively more demanding and therefore more costly observational 
forms of social learning?  
A naïve answer would be that mere gregariousness or living in larger 
rather than smaller groups provides sufficient conditions for the evolution 
of observational-learning abilities. However, there is no evidence for an ef-
fect of group size on the frequency of social learning, both within (Huff-
man & Hirata 2003) or among species (Reader & Laland 2002) of primates 
and among bird species (Lefebvre et al. 1996). Moreover, many group-
living lineages, such as equids, ground squirrels or lemurs show no evi-
dence for advanced social learning skills. Finally, a mathematical analysis 
suggested that the tolerance of models and the duration of close proximity 
to them are more important for the acquisition of complex skills than their 
number (van Schaik & Pradhan 2003). Obviously, when teaching is in-
volved, group size becomes even less important. 
More likely, the answer has to do with two factors: how easy is it to 
learn the skills independently, and how tolerant are models? First, acquir-
ing a skill by copying the model’s behaviour or goals is needed when the 
odds are poor that the naïve individual will independently come up with 
the skill by simply being pointed to the right situation through association 
or enhancement (cf. Boyd and Richerson 1996). It is therefore likely that 
selection for enhanced social-learning skills largely took place in an eco-
logical context where invented skills were especially useful, such as for 
extractive foragers or hunters (the co-evolution between these two cogni-
tive abilities will be explored later). A major role for ecology is plausible 
because social skills can often be learned through social interactions and 
eavesdropping (unlikely to require production imitation). 
Second, the opportunity for social acquisition of skills will depend on 
the benefits for models of being copied and how often and how long ob-
servational learning is possible. These conditions suggest observational 
learning abilities in species with slow-paced life history and long associa-
tions between parents or caretakers and immatures, which form stable so-
cial units with overlapping generations and high social tolerance. There is 
as yet not enough information on the taxonomic distribution of observa-
tional learning to test these suggestions, but the high incidence of simple 
imitation in birds noted above suggests that tolerant parent-offspring asso-
ciation and difficult diets play a major role. 
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Animals are expected to use their whole repertoire of social-learning 
abilities, but will rely on the most demanding ones to learn the most diffi-
cult skills. Indeed, in wild Bornean orang-utans, immatures use a variety of 
mechanisms to learn their skill set (Table 20.3), from proximity to 
scrounging to production imitation and emulation, often in combination, 
and also often insert bouts of practice after observing their mother perform 
a difficult skill (Jaeggi et al. 2010). 
GLOSSARY  
Affordances: Learned action possibilities, i.e. properties of objects or envi-
ronments that can be learned about by exploration, and then be used in 
subsequent behavioural actions. 
Culture: In the broadest sense, culture is used as socially transmitted informa-
tion, in the narrower one as socially transmitted technology and norms 
that involve conformity (‘the way we do things here’ McGrew 2004). 
Whiten and van Schaik (2007) separate it from tradition by noting that 
culture tends to contain multiple traditions in multiple domains. 
Model: The knowledgeable individual that may (passively) allow a naïve in-
dividual to acquire a particular skill or information, or (actively) pass it on 
through teaching. 
Social learning: changes in an individual’s behaviour resulting from attend-
ing to another individual’s behaviour or its products 
Tradition: An enduring distinctive behaviour patterns characteristic of social 
units and passed on through social learning (Fragaszy and Perry 2003). 
Teaching: Teaching has the following characteristics: (i) certain actions only 
occur in the presence of a naïve observer, (ii) these actions carry some 
cost but are not immediately beneficial to the teacher, and (iii) the ob-
server profits from these actions in that it learns these actions faster than it 
would otherwise do. 
20.4 Immediate consequences of social learning: 
traditions and culture 
20.4.1 Animal cultures 
Geographic variation in animal behaviour is normally explained by invok-
ing genetic or ecological processes. An ecological explanation would 
claim that all individuals exposed to a geographically localised set of habi-
tat features independently converge on the same behavioural response. A 
genetic explanation would argue that all individuals in a particular region 
have a strong genetic predisposition to develop the behaviour. This would 
generally lead to clear-cut geographic clusters, whose boundaries coincide 
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with subspecies boundaries or long-term dispersal barriers. However, so-
cial learning can also produce geographically varying presence or absence 
of behavioural variants, otherwise known as traditions or cultures.  
Culture has traditionally been considered a major dividing line between 
humans and animals. Yet, cultural anthropologists cannot really agree on a 
definition of culture (Durham 1991), except that it pervades all our actions 
and even our thinking, and have tended to concentrate on the belief sys-
tems, social norms and rituals of a society at the expense of its technology 
and subsistence pattern (McGrew 2004). A simpler biological definition of 
culture – socially transmitted skills and knowledge – is both consistent 
with the phenomena captured in human culture and applicable to animals. 
To satisfy it, animals in nature must acquire an innovative behaviour (i.e., 
behaviour that did not arise routinely in a given environment but was in-
stead invented by someone) by learning it from others who already possess 
this innovation. 
Because the word culture has long been earmarked for privileged use for 
the human species, some biologists have proposed to use the term tradition 
for cultural phenomena among animals. Traditions are defined as enduring 
distinctive behaviour patterns characteristic of social units and passed on 
through social learning (Fragaszy and Perry 2003). While this definition of 
animal cultures averts interdisciplinary spats and can encompass human 
culture, it also leads us to disregard possible conceptual and phylogenetic 
continuities. Moreover, the concept of tradition generally requires stability 
across generations, but animal data usually do not have the time-depth to 
demonstrate this. Here, I will use the word culture to stress the continuities 
with those among animals, while acknowledging the radically different 
uses that evolved among humans. 
Social learning does not automatically produce culture. Horizontally 
transmitted perishable information about environment (public information) 
or conspecifics (eavesdropping) does not lead to culture because any spa-
tial patterns are transient. Likewise, most vertically transmitted informa-
tion generally does not produce culture, because animals everywhere will 
readily stumble upon the same innovation. As a result, culture should 
largely be limited to taxa that can learn through observation and are intel-
ligent enough to come up with strong innovations (sensu Ramsey et al. 
2007). Even among the latter taxa, culture in the spatial sense may not 
arise if the species’ social organisation is such that all transmission is 
strictly vertical. In dolphins (Tursiops truncatus), for example, infants 
learn their foraging specialisations (i.e., innovations) exclusively from 
their mothers (Mann and Sargent 2003, Krützen et al. 2005), and there may 
be several different specialisations within a single locality, and indeed in 
most localities. However, despite the absence of geographic variation, it 
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would still make sense to call the behaviours involved cultural given that 
immatures acquire them developmentally through social learning. 
Primate fieldworkers developed an approach to bolster the cultural in-
terpretation of geographic variation, called the ethnographic, geographic or 
group-contrast method, or method of elimination (Boesch 1996, Whiten et 
al. 1999, van Schaik 2003). A behavioural variant is considered cultural if 
it is common wherever it occurs, consistent with its spread and mainte-
nance by social learning, but not clearly linked to ecological differences 
among the areas or genetic differences among the populations. By concen-
trating on behavioural variants that do not show clear genetic or ecological 
correlations in their spatial distribution, researchers could eliminate non-
cultural explanations. Together, these field-based, non-experimental meth-
ods have served to establish the plausibility of culture in chimpanzees 
(Whiten et al. 1999), cetaceans (Rendell and Whitehead 2001), orang-
utans (van Schaik et al. 2003), and capuchin monkeys (Perry et al. 2003). 
This interpretation was consistent with the demonstration of sophisticated 
and highly reliable observational forms of social learning in apes, espe-
cially chimpanzees (Whiten et al. 2005). 
The major weakness to date of these field methods is that they are useful 
as proof of principle but not to estimate the size of the cultural repertoire 
and thus to assess the importance of culture in nature (van Schaik 2009). 
By design, the geographic exclusion method ignores any behaviour that is 
correlated with ecological variables or genetic discontinuities, e.g. inclu-
sion in the diet of a particular food item, even if the animals are critically 
dependent on social learning for their maintenance (cf. Humle and Matsu-
zawa 2002). On the other hand, if it fails to recognise ecological or demo-
graphic factors that underlie the behaviour pattern, which therefore need 
not be socially transmitted, this technique will overestimate cultural reper-
toires (Laland et al. 2009). That said, most ape researchers would estimate 
that the 40 or so variants described for chimpanzees and the 30 or so de-
scribed for orang-utans are likely to be the tip of the cultural iceberg.  
It is important that additional techniques be developed to recognise cul-
tural variants in the wild. BOX 20.1 gives an overview of the methods 
available to date. 
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BOX 20.1  
Assessing culture  
Some non-experimental approaches to identify socially transmitted variants, 
based on observations of spatial patterns (Pattern) or evidence for, or indica-
tions of, social learning (Process). Based on Perry (2009), Laland et al. 
(2009), Whitehead (2009) and van Schaik (2009). 
Pattern 
(1) Across sites: the geographic or group-contrast method, assuming no eco-
logical or genetic differences between sites, and assuming within-site 
homogeneity of the incidence of the behaviour. A quantitative version 
turns it into a multiple matrix regression, estimating behavioural similar-
ity as a function of genetic similarity and ecological similarity, either for 
a particular behaviour pattern or a whole repertoire. 
(2) Across individuals: multiple matrix regression of behavioural similarity 
among individuals (of one or more populations) as a function of genetic 
and ecological similarity and past association (to estimate cumulative 
opportunities for social learning). 
(3) Features of behaviours: Identify the socially learned behaviour patterns 
in an individual’s repertoire, by showing that its emergence is associated 
with use of opportunities for social learning and practice when non-
routine behaviours are performed by models. Criteria include: (1) selec-
tive attention, e.g. by peering, suggesting observational social learning; 
(2) practice subsequent to selective attention; (3) begging and scroung-
ing, suggesting socially induced affordance learning; and (4) in the case 
of techniques, hand specialisation. 
Process 
(1) Documenting ontogeny: Link patterns of association and selective atten-
tion over time to the acquisition of a particular variant, whenever there is 
within-population variation. 
(2) Documenting spread: Examine the spread of an innovation whose origin 
was witnessed, against null models of association and rate of spread. 
20.4.2 Mapping variation in animal cultures 
To properly assess the distribution of culture in nature, i.e. which species 
have which components of culture as well as how humans differ from 
other animals we need to go beyond semantic debates and take a broad 
perspective. In principle we could estimate the strength of three potentially 
independent dimensions of socially transmitted innovations: (i) the com-
plexity of the innovation; (ii) the complexity of the social-learning tech-
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niques required to acquire the behaviour socially; and (iii) the extent to 
which a geographic imprint ensues.  
At this stage, a simple dichotomy on each dimension will suffice to 
frame the approach. Thus, innovations can be cognitively simple or cogni-
tively complex, depending on whether they could have arisen by chance 
and trial and error or instead required some form of insight to have been 
performed the first time (cf. Whiten and van Schaik 2007). Likewise, they 
could have been acquired by simple non-observational forms of social 
learning or by observational forms. Finally, we can divide cultural variants 
into those that do produce geographic variation with those that do not, ei-
ther because they are universal and ubiquitous everywhere or are inter-
spersed with other variants at many different sites (due to exclusive verti-
cal learning).  
Although this procedure still leaves eight possible states, in practice the 
number of observed states will be much smaller. As was already noted im-
plicitly, the complexity of innovation and social learning will tend to be 
correlated, because cognitive abilities limit the complexity of both innova-
tion and social learning, and thus the content and extent of cultural reper-
toires. The variants that are easily innovated and transmitted through sim-
ple mechanisms such as social facilitation or stimulus or local 
enhancement may be most widespread. They may also be linked to the 
third dimension because where innovations arise so easily we may not find 
any geographic variation. As the cognitive complexity of the innovation 
increases, more dedicated mechanisms of social learning are required for 
social transmission. These make the most interesting cultural variants, be-
cause social transmission is likely to be essential for their spread and main-
tenance, and geographic variation almost inevitably arises. 
This proposal can be linked to the content-based classification proposed 
earlier (Fig. 20.2). Perishable information cannot produce cultures. Labels 
are usually simple innovations requiring simple social learning mecha-
nisms and also need not produce geographic variation. Most cases of verti-
cal social transmission in nature may concern the faster than usual acquisi-
tion during development of species-wide foraging patterns or predator 
recognition, i.e. labels (cf. Galef and Giraldeau 2001). In most species, the 
learning processes involved need not be any different from the ones an 
animal would use when alone. Still, label variants may arise, as when dif-
ferent easily recognised foods are included in the diet in different places, 
although such cases will probably be rare. 
Skills, signal variants and symbols can more readily produce cultures. 
Whenever the cultural variant requires innovation, geographic variation is 
likely, at least for a certain amount of time. Well-known examples are the 
cultures found among great apes (including humans) and cetaceans, but 
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also those of capuchin monkeys or rats (Terkel 1996), even though in these 
cases the social-learning mechanism may involve no more than enhance-
ment. 
One extension immediately comes to mind. Cumulative culture refers to 
innovations that are beyond the reach of individual inventors and arose 
through the step-by-step accumulation of modifications to the variant that 
improved its function but moved it further and further away from the 
original innovation. These skills or social rules could be called cumulative 
innovations, which are one step up from complex innovations, and may 
rely on both production imitation and teaching to be transmitted. This 
gives us a three-step scale of complexity of innovation and social learning 
(Fig. 20.2). 
The value of scheme like that of Fig. 20.2 is heuristic, in that it should 
serve to focus the debate on the relevant aspects of the whole phenomenon 
of culture rather than on terminology. For instance, why are there no ex-
amples of cultures from such well-studied animals such as baboons, 
horses, great tits or sticklebacks? The scheme suggests that many of the 
culturally transmitted innovations in those taxa are labels that leave no 
geographic imprint. If new work necessitates its revision it will have 
served its purpose. 
20.5 Long-term consequences: culture and intelligence 
20.5.1 Culture and intelligence 
Most developing animals need environmental inputs to fine-tune their 
brains so as to acquire the behavioural repertoire most appropriate in the 
current conditions, a phenomenon called constructive learning (Quartz 
2003). Play is an example of active attempts to generate such inputs that 
serve to train the motor system (Fairbanks 2000). When it comes to acquir-
ing knowledge or specific skills, social learning should improve the signal-
to-noise ratio of these inputs because animals learn skills faster when 
learning socially than when learning (i.e. generating sensory inputs) alone. 
Indeed, there are clear developmental effects of social learning on an indi-
vidual’s repertoire of cognitive skills, as shown by comparisons among 
wild great ape populations (van Schaik et al. 2003) as well as the results of 
social deprivation and enculturation experiments (van Schaik and Burkart 
unpubl. data). Thus, if there is a niche-construction element to an individ-
ual’s set of learned skills, and if this set approximates intelligence, intelli-
gence is culturally constructed (Tomasello 1999). 
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To the extent that this ontogenetic account is correct, culture should in 
the long run affect intelligence. Species with frequent opportunities for so-
cial learning should more readily respond to selection pressures to add 
cognitive abilities, so that they should end up with larger relative brain size 
on average than species that have fewer opportunities for social learning. 
The cultural intelligence hypothesis (van Schaik 2004) therefore predicts a 
tight positive interspecific correlation between social learning performance 
and individual learning ability. There is evidence for this at the level of 
frequencies of innovation and social learning (Reader and Laland 2002) 
and at the level of level of maximum complexity achieved (van Schaik and 
Burkart unpubl. data). It also predicts that cultural species are more intelli-
gent, but there is not enough comparative information to test this predic-
tion yet. Thus, culture could provide a compelling explanation for the evo-
lution of intelligence, complementing accounts that focus exclusively on 
the fitness benefits of enhanced cognitive abilities, such as the social brain 
or technical intelligence hypotheses (Byrne & Bates 2007). 
20.5.2 Cultural evolution 
Cultural transmission systems have some properties that are fundamentally 
different form regular organic evolution, as summarised in Table 20.4 (af-
ter Danchin et al. 2004). Whereas mutations are random with respect to 
fitness, most innovations are not, but instead improve fitness. Moreover, 
the transmission of favourable variants, slow and noisy in organic evolu-
tion since it has to rely on natural selection of individuals across genera-
tions, can be fast and precise in the case of social transmission. Cultural se-
lection is therefore truly Lamarckian, and this new system of inheritance 
can in principle be far more efficient than classic natural selection. It 
would appear to be the silver bullet toward almost instantaneous adapta-
tion to local conditions, and thus highly adaptive for species that colonise 
new habitats or encounter temporal changes in their habitats – in other 
words, pretty much all species. Why, then, is cultural evolution so rare in 
nature? 
We have seen that many species rely on social learning, yet few have 
traditions and even fewer have cultures, as defined here, and only humans 
have truly cumulative culture. Thus, the features of this table only apply to 
very few species, and in its more extreme forms only to humans. Culture is 
almost synonymous with being human, and may be our most successful 
adaptation. One reason for this is that the proper adoption of innovations, 
i.e. potentially novel cultural variants, requires the cognitively most com-
plex forms of observational learning along with teaching. This combina-
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tion may be limited to humans. The absence of cumulative culture in great 
apes or other species capable of observational learning (Whiten et al. 
2004) suggests that some factor was added during human evolution. One 
recent hypothesis is that the pro-active prosociality induced by the adop-
tion of cooperative breeding during human evolution served to add both 
the teaching component and, in the long run, the increased cognitive de-
mands of observational social learning (Burkart et al. 2009a). 
20.5.3 Toward a unified science of culture 
Cultures can be dynamic, changing continuously due to innovation, forget-
ting, dropping out of fashion, demographic changes, etc. Cultures can re-
main stagnant due to lack of innovation, but even when innovations are 
produced they may not spread due to social conformity or conservatism. 
Thus, a mature theory of culture should contain the following elements:  
 
• The rate of innovation: One obvious factor affecting this rate is popula-
tion size (Henrich 2004), but this will be affected by the degree of con-
servatism, which in turn may depend on the presence of environmental 
crises, such as famine or war, and perhaps on demographic factors, such 
as the presence of a large bulge of adolescents, more willing than others 
to try out new innovations. 
• The nature of social transmission mechanisms: The mechanism may 
critically affect the spread of innovations and the reliability of their 
transmission (Boyd and Richerson 1996). 
• Biases in the transmission of innovations: Strong conformity will tend 
to slow down cultural change, whereas prestige-based copying will tend 
to speed it up. The more individual evaluation of novel variants encoun-
tered by a naïve individual takes place, the slower cultural change 
(Richerson and Boyd 2005). 
• Conditions affecting transmission: The effective size of the social net-
work plays a major role, which is strongly affected by association pat-
terns and social tolerance among individuals (e.g. van Schaik and Prad-
han 2003, Henrich 2004), as should social relations between social units 
(diffusion) and the identity of the dispersing sex. An additional factor is 
the intrinsic salience of the innovation, which is partly a function of its 
domain. For instance, orang-utans perceive comfort innovations as 
much less salient than those linked to feeding or communication (van 
Schaik et al. 2006). 
• Conditions affecting diffusion: The degree to which separate populations 
are open to diffusion of variants from others may be especially impor-
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tant where populations are small and poorly networked, and variants are 
therefore prone to extinction. The presence of dispersal barriers (e.g. 
due to habitat fragmentation), the sex of the dispersers, and the degree to 
which dispersers are integrated socially all play a role. 
• Tradeoffs between innovative and social-learning ability: Exclusive re-
liance on social learning may interfere with directing attention toward 
individual exploration, and thus solving problems. For instance, Burkart 
et al. (2009b) showed that those individual marmosets (Callithrix jac-
chus) that were better at social learning a new foraging task than others 
were less quick to notice the presence of a hitherto unavailable shortcut 
to food. Thus, in a population of social-learning specialists, culture may 
get stuck. However, the presence of different personality types within a 
population may remove this obstacle to cumulative cultural change. 
 
Such a mature theory of culture would not only explain the taxonomic 
variation in the presence of culture, repertoire sizes within and across spe-
cies, or the longevity of individual traditions, but also the relative role of 
culture in such well-known human phenomena as the upper Paleolithic 
revolution (Powell et al. 2009) or the adoption of agriculture. 
20.6 Conclusions and outlook 
Every developing animal must acquire a number of skills to be successful 
in its habitat and social organisation through learning, although species 
may differ dramatically in the actual number of learned skills. Most come 
equipped with a set of near-instinctive response predispositions, which 
may be honed by social learning, and thus produce local diets and niches. 
Where studied, immatures have a preference for social over individual 
learning, and adults wherever possible make widespread use of eavesdrop-
ping or public information. Moreover, several individuals learn complex 
skills they would otherwise almost certainly not have acquired. Still, cul-
tural evolution in nature seems largely confined to humans. 
Nonetheless, the reader must have noted from the way findings or pat-
terns were formulated that much of our knowledge in this young field is 
still tentative. At the same time, it is clear that an improved understanding 
of cultural phenomena in animals is vital for evolutionary biology and es-
pecially evolutionary anthropology. Theorising has run well ahead of em-
pirical research. 
One important avenue for future research is to unravel the relative im-
portance of genetic endowment, ecological conditions and opportunities 
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for social learning in bringing about an individual’s behavioural repertoire, 
and to compare the picture across a wide array of species. Tools for this 
task are as yet inadequate, but they are being developed (Laland et al. 
2009; see also BOX 20.1). This analysis needs to be done in a range of 
species, varying from those with suspected cultural variation, such as great 
apes and cetaceans, to species for which such variation is thought to be ab-
sent, such as many birds and fishes. 
Another very important issue is innovation. Little is known about what 
produces innovation, probably because it is a by-product of individual ex-
ploration (perhaps related to personality: Bergmüller, this volume). Yet, 
the presence of culture relies on it (Fig. 20.2), and cumulative culture is 
critically dependent on continuing innovation. In order to get some pur-
chase on the role of innovation in the production of animal culture, solid 
operational definitions are needed. These are being developed (Reader and 
Laland 2003, Ramsey et al. 2007) and tested (van Schaik et al. 2006, 
Lehner et al. in press). I expect that a good theory for the conditions that 
favour or hinder the incidence of innovation and of their spread and main-
tenance through social learning will contribute to solving the puzzle of the 
limited taxonomic distribution of culture and the near-absence of cumula-
tive cultural evolution in animals. 
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Glossary: 
INDEX: 
Affordance p.2, 3 
BIOL  p. 7 (see also transmission bias) 
Communication p.2 
Conservatism  p. 11 
Cross-fostering p. 10 
Culture   p. 13, 14, 15, 16 
 geographic variation p. 15  
 assessing culture p. 14, 15 (box 1) 
 cumulative p. 17 
 and intelligence p. 18 
 as adaptation  p. 19, 20 
Eavesdropping  p. 8, 10, 14 
Emulation  p. 4 
Enhancement (local or stimulus) p. 3 
Facilitation (Social) p.3 
Imitation  p. 4 
 Contextual, familiar p. 4 
 Production, motor, novel p. 4 
 Over-imitation  p. 11 
Information  p. 6 
 perishable p. 6, 17 
 public p. 8, 14 
Innovation  p. 6, 17, 19, 21 
Label  p.6, 17 
Lamarck p. 18 
Learning p.2 
 Learning from social information p.3 
 Learning through social interaction p. 5 
 Costs  p. 9, 11 
 Observational p. 4 
Mate choice copying p. 8 
Meme  p. 5 
Mirror neurons p. 4 
Play  p. 5, 18 
Scrounging  p. 7 
Signal variant  p. 6, 17 
Skill  p.6, 17 
Social learning p.2, 3 
 Adaptiveness p. 9, 10 
 Horizontal p. 7, 11 
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 Oblique p. 7 
 Vertical p. 7, 10 
Symbol  p. 6 
Teaching  p. 5 
Tradition  p. 13 
Transmission bias  p. 7 
 Conformity  p. 8, 19 
 Content bias  p. 8 
 Prestige bias  p. 7, 19 
 
 
Table 20.1 The main kinds of social learning distinguished here. 
Learning by attending to 
social information 
Non-observational  
social learning 
1. facilitation / gregarious-
ness 
2. enhancement 
Observational social  
learning 
3. contextual imitation /  
observational conditioning 
4. production imitation / 
emulation 
Learning through social  
interaction 
1. interaction conditioning 
2. teaching 
 
Table 20.2 Comparing anthropological and behavioural-ecology approaches. 
                       Field 
Emphasis 
Anthropology-
Psychology-
Primatology 
Behavioural Ecology 
Direction of transfer vertical and oblique horizontal 
Content labels and skills perishable information 
Method of social  
learning studied? 
yes no 
Consequences traditions or culture  
(often) 
not so 
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Table 20.3 Kinds of learning deployed by orang-utan infants to acquire their diet, 
and the nature of the foods and the knowledge acquired this way (after Jaeggi et 
al. 2008, 2010). 
Social/  
individual 
learning? 
Independent 
exploration 
Parent-offspring association 
Mechanism 
 
individual trial 
and error 
proximity 
and en-
hancement 
+ informa-
tional food 
transfer 
+ observa-
tional learn-
ing 
+ teach-
ing 
% items in 
Pongo diet 
< 1% ≈ 54% ≈ 46% ≈ 17% 0% 
Food types common and easy-to-process rare and difficult-to-
process 
extracted 
Kind of 
knowledge 
Labels (what?) Skills (how?) 
 
Table 20.4 The main distinguishing features of regular (organic) and cultural evo-
lution. 
 Organic evolution 
(Darwinian) 
Cultural evolution 
(Lamarckian) 
Raw material Mutation (non-directed, 
usually deleterious) 
Innovation (usually directed, 
rarely deleterious) 
Spread of favorable 
variants 
through differential lifetime 
reproductive success across 
many generations 
through adoption, potentially 
within a single generation 
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Fig. 20.1 Social learning in nature is often vertical: immatures learn from their 
mother, as in this Bornean orang-utan mother-infant pair. Photo © Lynda Dunkel. 
 
 
Fig. 20.2 The dimensions of tradition and culture. 
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